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Physician Aid-in-Dying and Suicide Prevention in Psychiatry: A Moral Crisis? 
 
Abstract:  Involuntary psychiatric commitment for suicide prevention and physician aid-in-dying 
(PAD) in terminal illness combine to create a moral dilemma.  If PAD in terminal illness is 
permissible, it should also be permissible for some who suffer from non-terminal psychiatric 
illness: suffering provides much of the justification for PAD, and the suffering in mental illness 
can be as severe as in physical illness.  But involuntary psychiatric commitment to prevent suicide 
suggests that the suffering of persons with mental illness does not justify ending their own lives, 
ruling out PAD. Since both practices have compelling underlying justifications, the most 
reasonable accommodation might seem to be to allow PAD for persons with mental illness whose 
suffering is severe enough to justify self-killing, but prohibit PAD for persons whose suffering is 
less severe. This compromise, however, would require the articulation of standards by which 
persons’ mental as well as physical suffering could be evaluated.  Doing so would present a serious 
philosophical challenge.  
 




Psychiatry and other mental health professions in the United States may be about to face a moral 
crisis. It has long been the case that mental health providers in the U.S. and other countries have 
been empowered to use coercive measures, particularly involuntary civil commitment to 
psychiatric hospitals, to prevent death by suicide in persons with mental illness.  This practice is a 
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crucial element of mental health care. We think, however, that it is deeply inconsistent with a 
somewhat more recent trend, namely the legalization of physician aid-in-dying (PAD; also referred 
to as physician-assisted suicide and medical aid-in-dying). The inconsistency we see, which is 
already being felt more intensely in Canada, the Netherlands, and other jurisdictions that have gone 
farther in legalizing PAD and euthanasia, is that the implicit rationale for laws allowing PAD in 
the U.S. is that suffering can be an adequate reason for self-killing; but this implies, we argue, that 
suffering due to mental illnesses should at least sometimes be an adequate justification for self-
killing, too. On the other hand, laws allowing involuntary civil commitment for the purpose of 
suicide prevention imply that suffering due to mental illness is pretty much never a good reason 
for self-killing. The inconsistency between PAD and involuntary commitment procedures matters 
because both practices seem morally justified; neither can be rejected out of hand.  Nor, we think, 
can the inconsistency be dismissed by understanding the rationale for PAD differently: although 
the explicit rationale for laws allowing PAD in the U.S. is usually respect for autonomy rather than 
the alleviation of suffering, the ultimate justification for respecting the autonomy of people with 
terminal illnesses who seek PAD is the recognition that their suffering can be severe. Instead, we 
argue, resolving the inconsistency in a satisfactory way would require us to articulate objective 
standards for evaluating the severity of others’ suffering.  The conflict between PAD and 
involuntary commitment poses a difficult question: when is a person’s suffering so bad that it is 
reasonable for her to kill herself, and when is it not?  And to what extent can the judgment that her 
suffering is so severe as to justify killing herself be left up to the person herself? 
To avoid any misconceptions, we should clarify early on that the problem we see is not 
merely that PAD, from the standpoint of psychiatry, is a form of suicide, while psychiatry is 
opposed to suicide.  Regardless of how they should be classified (Pies 2018), we think there are 
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many important differences between the kinds of deaths typically resulting from PAD and most 
suicides, as detailed in a 2017 statement of the American Association of Suicidology (AAS) 
([omitted for review]) with which one of us ([omitted for review]) was involved.  Nor do we think 
that psychiatrists should reflexively, and non-reflectively, interfere with all persons who reveal 
that they are planning on killing themselves when these plans are in accord with existing PAD 
laws (Yager, et al. 2018).  Likewise, our concern is not that PAD laws in the U.S. allow assisted 
dying for most persons with mental illness; they do not.  All U.S. laws to date require that a 
(physical) illness be “terminal” (i.e., that death reasonably can be expected to occur within six 
months), and that the person making the decision is does not suffer from impaired judgment 
because of a mental illness or other condition.  Many persons who would seek PAD for a mental 
illness would fall afoul of one or both of these exclusions.  Rather, we think, PAD and civil 
commitment processes are in conflict because they reflect mutually incompatible ideas about the 
disvalue of suffering and the value of life.   
 
II. Suffering, Autonomy, and Mental Illness 
Suffering as legal rationale  
Let us first consider the implications of PAD laws for persons with mental illness.  We 
think there is one main justification for pursuing PAD in central cases—physical-illness-only cases 
like severely painful and untreatable metastatic cancer or advanced amyotrophic lateral sclerosis 
(ALS).  It is that those conditions cause suffering.  We embrace Cassell’s claim that “suffering 
occurs when an impending destruction of the person is perceived; it continues until the threat of 
disintegration has passed or until the integrity of the person can be restored in some other manner” 
(Cassel 1982), and note that others have defined suffering similarly (Charmaz 1983).  Diseases 
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like ALS can cause suffering in two very broad ways.  First, they cause suffering by producing 
unpleasant sensations and emotions—pain, in short—that seems to threaten one’s personal 
integrity by its very intensity, or which is regarded as being without meaning, or which one feels 
one does not have adequate reason to endure.  The second way physical diseases cause suffering 
is by diminishing one’s capacities and thereby threatening one’s dignity, identity, selfhood, or 
independence.  We believe both types of concerns can motivate individuals’ decisions to pursue 
PAD.   
Some have criticized Cassell’s analysis of suffering on various grounds (Braude 2012, 
Svenaeus 2014, Bueno-Gomez 2017), and one might also question whether our application of the 
concept is wholly consistent with Cassell’s.  But our use of the term “suffering” is intended 
primarily to designate a diverse set of personal experiences that could motivate terminally ill 
persons to end their own lives; we think our dual categorization of those experiences, though 
probably imperfect, is close enough to correct, and sufficiently capacious to capture the majority 
of them. The most common reasons given for their actions by those who pursued PAD in Oregon 
were, in addition to the avoidance of pain, wanting to control the circumstances of death, and 
concerns about loss of independence, poor quality of life, and inability to care for one’s self  
(Ganzini, et al. 2009).  Similarly, a Dutch survey of those who had pursued euthanasia “showed 
that patients express their unbearable and unrelieved suffering in terms of pain, weakness, 
functional impairment, dependency, being a burden, hopelessness, indignity, intellectual 
deterioration, perception of loss of oneself, loss of autonomy, and being tired of life” (Dees, et al. 
2010).    
The rationale of alleviating suffering in this sense is explicit in most European 
PAD/euthanasia laws and in the Canadian supreme court decision in Carter v. Canada, which 
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reference the notion of “unbearable” or “intolerable” suffering (Termination of Life on Request 
and Assisted Suicide Act  2001, McLachlin, et al. 2015). We think it is also implicit in the practice 
of PAD in the U.S, although in most states that have legalized the practice the relevant statutes 
merely make reference to “suffering from a terminal illness” and do not explicitly state that the 
relief of suffering itself is a prerequisite or even an understandable motive for PAD (Oregon Death 
with Dignity Act  1994, Washington Death with Dignity Act  2009, Vermont Patient Choice at 
End of Life Act  2013, California End of Life Act  2015, Colorado End-of-Life Options Act  2016, 
District of Columbia Death with Dignity Act  2016).  The Our Care, Our Choice Act recently 
passed by Hawaii is an exception, as it clearly states that its rationale is to provide “the right to 
choose to avoid an unnecessarily prolonged life of pain and suffering” (Hawaii Our Care, Our 
Choice Act  2018).   
To be sure, our point is not necessarily that all of the lawmakers and voters who decided 
to permit PAD in various U.S. jurisdictions to date were motivated by a desire to relieve patients’ 
suffering or that they believed that severe suffering due to a terminal illness could justify PAD.  
But we do think that much of the moral appeal of the legalization of PAD rests on recognition of 
the fact that it can be reasonable to want to end one’s life when one’s illness causes, or at least 
threatens, sufficiently severe suffering.  After signing California’s assisted suicide law, Governor 
Jerry Brown stated: “In the end, I was left to reflect on what I would want in the face of my own 
death…. I do not know what I would do if I were dying in prolonged and excruciating pain. I am 
certain, however, that it would be a comfort to be able to consider the options afforded by this bill. 
And I wouldn’t deny that right to others” (Megerian 2015).  This echoes the rhetoric that patients 
who have advocated for access to PAD have used. Holly Warland, an Australian woman with limb 
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girdle muscular dystrophy, a severe degenerative illness, explains her support for assisted-dying 
legislation in terms of concern about her own suffering:  
I have been given the opportunity to advocate for issues close to my heart. One of 
these issues is the legalization of Voluntary Assisted Dying in my state. The 
unfortunate reality for me is that this condition will eventually make life unbearable 
for me and I want a safe and reliant option to end my life when I am ready. I never 
thought this was an issue I would become so passionate about but when I stopped 
to think about it, it’s my only humane option. I could wait until I die naturally but 
that might be decades of more pain and suffering. I work with a group called Dying 
with Dignity Queensland to convince and work with politicians to pass fair and 
merciful voluntary assisted dying laws (Warland 2018).   
Perhaps most compellingly, Brittany Maynard, a  newly married young woman with terminal brain 
cancer who moved from California to Oregon to use the latter state’s death with dignity law to end 
her life, articulated her reasons for doing so in terms of her suffering:   
Because my tumor is so large, doctors prescribed full brain radiation. I read about 
the side effects: The hair on my scalp would have been singed off. My scalp would 
be left covered with first-degree burns. My quality of life, as I knew it, would be 
gone. After months of research, my family and I reached a heartbreaking 
conclusion: There is no treatment that would save my life, and the recommended 
treatments would have destroyed the time I had left. I considered passing away in 
hospice care at my San Francisco Bay-area home. But even with palliative 
medication, I could develop potentially morphine-resistant pain and suffer 
personality changes and verbal, cognitive and motor loss of virtually any kind. 
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Because the rest of my body is young and healthy, I am likely to physically hang on 
for a long time even though cancer is eating my mind. I probably would have 
suffered in hospice care for weeks or even months. And my family would have had 
to watch that. I did not want this nightmare scenario for my family, so I started 
researching death with dignity (Maynard 2014).  
 
Suffering versus autonomy 
Despite these appeals, one might read the existing statutes prior to Hawaii’s as motivated 
primarily by protection of patients’ autonomy.  While respect for autonomy is an important part 
of the justification for the laws in Hawaii and other states, we think that public willingness to allow 
persons to make this choice for themselves must be underwritten by the recognition that it is 
sometimes reasonable, and this is presumably because of the suffering involved.  In contrast, 
respect for autonomy is frequently withheld in legal contexts when the choices at issue are widely 
regarded as unreasonable, as with decisions to use certain illicit drugs or to ride a motorcycle 
without a helmet (Dworkin 1972).  We also surmise that medical aid in dying would typically be 
made available by clinicians only in cases where a patient is suffering substantially or is likely to 
do so in the near future.  It is true that data collected in Oregon and elsewhere cites “loss of 
autonomy” as highest among the reasons for a patient’s desire for PAD (Ganzini, Goy and Dobscha 
2009), but we understand this concern as relating to the loss of autonomy in the sense meaning 
personal integrity and independence.  And this is, again, a sort of suffering.  Finally, the effect of 
laws allowing PAD is not merely to authorize patients to end their own lives, but to permit 
physicians to assist them in doing so.  The decision to relax a standing prohibition on aiding others 
in dying is therefore not merely a question of choosing to respect autonomy; for if that were so, 
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the prohibition should be relaxed generally, and not only for the terminally ill and the physicians 
who care for them (for a different interpretation of these issues, however, see den Hartogh 2017). 
 
The parity argument 
So we think it is clear that the justification for PAD laws in the U.S., as elsewhere, depends 
in large part on the recognition that suffering—whether due to painful sensations or to the loss of 
dignity, self, or independence—can sometimes be an adequate reason to end one’s own life, and 
that persons who suffer severely because of a terminal physical illness and who retain decision-
making capacity should be allowed to pursue PAD.  Either kind of suffering, though, could plague 
persons afflicted by mental illnesses, even in the absence of any physical illness.  It is true, of 
course, that fewer people with mental illness would suffer as severely as they do if they had better 
access to psychiatric care and other services, and true as well that existing psychiatric treatments 
are not as effective as anyone would like.  Still, we think it is clear that the suffering associated 
with mental illnesses can sometimes be as severe, intractable, and prolonged as the suffering due 
to physical illnesses.  Accordingly, it seems to us that if severe suffering can justify PAD for some 
persons with terminal physical illnesses, it should justify PAD for some persons with mental 
illnesses, too. Call this the parity argument.  As Ogilvie and Potts, writing in the United Kingdom 
and hence in the proximity of countries where euthanasia is legal, say regarding persons with 
depression, “the intensity of psychic pain suffered by some patients with severe affective disorders 
must be acknowledged. In moments of candor some professionals may admit sympathy for the 
view that in severe and persistent depressive illness, when all appropriate physical treatments, 
including polypharmacy, electroconvulsive therapy, and psychosurgery, have apparently been 
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exhausted, voluntary euthanasia may sometimes seem to be as justifiable an option as it does in 
intractable physical illness” (Ogilvie, et al. 1994).    
 
Suffering versus terminality 
The parity argument is relatively simple, but defending it is more complex. Opponents of 
PAD in mental illness, such as the American Psychiatric Association (Joint Reference Committee 
2016) and several psychiatrists who have recently written on this subject (Komrad 2017, Pies 
2017) might be inclined to dispute it by a variety of methods.  First, they might reasonably suggest 
that the permissibility of PAD in some physical illnesses depends not only on the suffering 
associated with them but also on the fact that they are terminal.  Why might terminality matter? 
One thought is that when an illness is terminal it means that the life lost to PAD is minimal, 
lowering the justificatory bar. Another is that terminality means that PAD does not really cause 
death but merely changes the timing of it, where it is really caused by the disease.  
Neither of these, though, would be a good reason to deny access to PAD to all persons who 
suffer because of mental illness.  The first objection invokes a balancing of the value of a certain 
unit of time alive against the disvalue of suffering (an idea to which we will return later).  But if it 
is simply a matter of balancing harms and benefits, it is easy to imagine cases where the suffering 
due to mental illness is so severe that even with a relatively long expected natural lifespan, ending 
one’s life would still be justifiable: continuing life is not a benefit in this case, but a harm.  And 
even if one were to somehow reject the idea that terminality matters because of the balance of 
harms and benefits, and insist that it is something about the nearness of death itself that makes 
PAD acceptable, one has to consider cases where a person has intense suffering due to mental 
illness and is already so aged that he is near the end of his natural lifespan.  Then, the requirement 
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that the amount of life lost to PAD should be small would be satisfied and PAD should, at least 
for elderly persons, be regarded as a reasonable request.1 
We find the claim that PAD does not really cause death, but only changes its timing, to be 
problematic. Were it true, it would imply that murdering a terminally ill person against her wishes 
does not cause her death, which is false.  We would also note that in some cases where PAD in 
physical illness is clearly permissible, the illness may not really be terminal in the sense of 
dramatically shortening the life of the patient.  Perhaps such cases are not strictly legal in the U.S., 
but we suspect it sometimes occurs that physical illnesses are deemed “terminal” because the 
suffering associated with them is severe, even though death is not really predicted to occur soon 
(there is some practical laxity in the idea that “death can reasonably be expected to occur within 
six months”).  An elderly man in intense and unrelenting pain from metastatic prostate cancer 
might live for several years in that state (Gandaglia, et al. 2015); so, too, might a person who has 
lost his independence from ALS (Byrne, et al. 2013); still, both should, and sometimes—perhaps 
even often—would, be deemed “terminal” and eligible for PAD if they requested it. 
The biggest problem with objections rooted in terminality, however, is that terminality is 
not itself a reason to pursue PAD.  It would be strange to help someone die merely because she is 
already dying, if there is nothing else for her (or others) to gain by it.  Accordingly, it must be 
suffering, or the prospect of such, that provides the moral justification for PAD in cases of physical 
illness. Terminality is, then, merely a safeguard, and not a rationale for PAD.  But if a safeguard, 
presumably it is designed to prevent a slippery slope, at the bottom of which there are people who 
might otherwise lead (sufficiently) long, happy lives who access PAD inappropriately.  In that 
case, however, to exclude persons with intense suffering due to mental illnesses, who are clearly 
                                                     
1 We will mention but not argue for the controversial idea that some mental illnesses could also be considered terminal; 
were that the case, it would be a further reason for thinking terminality cannot exclude all mental illnesses from PAD. 
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not leading happy lives and are never very likely to do so, on the grounds that they are non-terminal 
seems question-begging. 
 
Mental illness and decision-making 
A different kind of objection to the parity argument is that persons who request PAD in 
mental illness typically lack decision-making capacity as a result of their afflictions, and therefore 
should never qualify under U.S. laws, even if those laws permitted PAD for other non-terminal 
illnesses; after all, existing U.S. statutes uniformly require that recipients of PAD not be suffering 
from impaired judgment due to a mental illness.  Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, for example, 
states “If in the opinion of the attending physician or the consulting physician a patient may be 
suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing impaired judgment, 
either physician shall refer the patient for counseling. No medication to end a patient’s life in a 
humane and dignified manner shall be prescribed until the person performing the counseling 
determines that the patient is not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or 
depression causing impaired judgment” (Oregon Death with Dignity Act  1994). 
We certainly accept, as a general rule, that persons with clearly impaired decision-making 
capacity should not be eligible for PAD.  But the other premise on which this objection is founded 
is suspect.  While mental illnesses sometimes undermine judgment and decision-making capacity, 
this is not always the case.  For one thing, mental illnesses are often episodic. Persons with bipolar 
disorder, substance use disorders, schizophrenia, and even unipolar depression are sometimes 
better (indeed, virtually symptom-free), and sometimes worse (Ciompi 1980, Judd, et al. 2002). 
But if so, then a person with a mental illness could have intact decision-making capacity between 
episodes of that illness, while also having a reasonable expectation that he will suffer severely in 
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the future, such that he might understandably request PAD to avoid the inevitable recurrence of 
the intolerable episodes. Virginia Woolf’s suicide could be a case of this sort; sensing the approach 
of another episode of her bipolar illness, she wrote in a suicide note to her husband: “I feel certain 
that I am going mad again. I feel we can't go through another of those terrible times. And I shan't 
recover this time. I begin to hear voices, and I can't concentrate. So I am doing what seems the 
best thing to do.” (Woolf 1941).  
Then too, on some occasions, persons with severe mental illness might retain capacity in 
spite of active illness, at least with respect to some decisions (Roberts 1998, Hougham, et al. 2003, 
Dunn, et al. 2007, Candilis, et al. 2008).  Although we tend to think of mental illnesses as affecting 
a person globally and impairing all of her thought processes, in reality, mental illnesses vary in 
their effects and many do not limit all of a person’s capacities in all contexts. Decision-making 
capacity has roughly two conditions. The first is that the reasoning, knowledge, and other cognitive 
abilities backing the decision be relatively intact.  The second is that the decision is voluntary and 
authentic, which typically means that the values and other motives producing the decision are 
“one’s own.”  Mental illnesses can undermine capacity by affecting either condition (Charland 
2002, Charland, et al. 2016).  It is, we will suppose, uncontroversial that a request for PAD made 
because of cognitive processes that are disrupted by illness is invalid.  But we think it is at least 
possible that a person with a mental illness could retain the capacity to choose PAD even though 
the illness has affected her values.   
There are several ways this could be true. One thing to consider is that mental illnesses 
may not affect all of a person’s values equally, and so may undermine her capacity to make some 
decisions and not others. A person with anorexia nervosa, for example, may not have the capacity 
to decide whether she should try to lose weight, or even, at times, to decide what she will eat for 
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lunch, because those sorts of decisions are rooted in values that are distorted by her illness (Tan, 
et al. 2003, Tan, et al. 2006).  But when her decisions are not thematically related to her illness, 
she is more likely to have capacity—such as when she makes a decision about which college to 
attend or whom to marry.  Accordingly, if a person with a mental illness chooses PAD, and his 
illness is unlikely to have affected the values underwriting that decision (and if he is not suffering 
from cognitive distortions because of the illness), we have less reason to suspect that his illness 
has thwarted his capacity.  Thus, we should at least acknowledge the potential capacity behind 
requests for PAD in illnesses such as obsessive-compulsive disorder or substance use disorders, to 
which suicidal ideation, hopelessness, and other motives for seeking death are not intrinsic.  In 
these cases, if a person is hopeless and wishes for death, it is more likely to be a reaction to the 
illness afflicting her than a reaction from it. 
But what about illnesses like major depressive disorder and borderline personality disorder 
for which hopelessness and suicidal ideation are characteristic (American Psychiatric Association 
2013), which therefore are frequently marked by distortions in values that would make someone 
more likely to pursue PAD?  Then, requests for PAD are less likely to be made with full capacity.  
Even in these cases, however, it is far from clear that the illness always compromises each of the 
values and other motives to which it could be thematically related.  We might imagine, to choose 
a simpler example, that someone with a severe phobia of dogs could still voluntarily choose to 
avoid a particularly dangerous or aggressive neighborhood dog on his morning walk, since this is 
something many who lack his phobia would choose, and it is at least possible that the desires 
motiving his decision are his own.  We might similarly imagine that someone with severe, active 
depression might both have a suicidal desire as a reaction from her depression and a suicidal desire 
as a reaction to her depression, because she independently, authentically feels she should no longer 
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have to suffer the other pains associated with the illness.  If the latter desire is the dominant one, 
she would, we imagine, retain the capacity to request PAD.   
An independent reason to think that persons with mental illness can sometimes retain the 
capacity to request PAD is that medicine is committed to assuming that persons with mental 
illnesses are often competent to make other choices about life-threatening matters, even when 
those choices could be affected by core characteristics of their disorders.  Persons with severe 
mental illness are frequently deemed competent to make decisions about medical or psychiatric 
treatment, such as to request admission to the hospital, to take medications, or to undergo 
electroconvulsive therapy.  But decisions of this sort at least occasionally require the same level 
of decision-making capacity as decisions to pursue PAD, since the complexity of the decision (in 
terms of the reasoning and background knowledge of one’s medical condition required) is 
presumably similar, and the harms and benefits are sometimes, though not always, similar in 
magnitude—after all, ECT can sometimes be lifesaving, and the patient seeking PAD judges, in 
contrast, that her life is no longer livable.  Accordingly, it follows that persons with severe mental 
illness at least sometimes possess the capacity to make decisions to pursue PAD.   
To reject this conclusion, you would have to suppose that persons with mental illness who 
choose PAD necessarily lack capacity because they are choosing something bad. There are at least 
three problems with this, however.  First, it begs the question against proponents of PAD in mental 
illness by assuming that choosing death in the case of suffering due to such illness is always bad.  
Second, some might be uncomfortable with the idea that our judgments about others’ capacity 
should hinge on judgments about their values (Kious 2016).  Finally, it is often observed that 
standards for capacity vary depending on the risks associated with the decision in question 
(Buchanan, et al. 1989): in cases where the suffering involved is considerable, this would seem to 
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reduce the relative risks of the decision (by increasing the expected benefit, the elimination of 
more severe suffering), which implies that sometimes the threshold for capacity for persons with 
mental illness should sometimes be relatively low. 
We acknowledge, though, that even if a person with a mental illness can sometimes have 
the capacity to make decisions in spite of her illness, there is still an epistemic problem: how should 
we know that this is the case?  As Gupta and Desmarais ask,  “how can one be sure that one is not 
unwittingly colluding with a person’s pathology rather than respecting a person’s well-considered 
judgment?” (Gupta, et al. 2016).  Attempts to answer this question to date have relied primarily on 
clinical assessments of whether the person requesting PAD or euthanasia is depressed.  When, for 
instance, the Dutch psychiatrist Boudewijn Chabot helped “Mrs. B.” to die, he judged that, 
although she saw continued existence as a pointless burden and craved death, she was not 
depressed (Klotzko, et al. 1995).  One difficulty, however, is that such clinical judgments are 
highly subjective (Charland, Lemmens and Wada 2016), and to that extent likely to be influenced 
by whether the clinician is favorably disposed to the patient’s initial request.  A second difficulty 
is that this approach offers little help to clinicians who are not confident about what to do in the 
first place.  Ultimately, we do not see an easy way to resolve this epistemic worry.  But we would 
note that it cuts both ways: although Gupta and Desmarais are correct that allowing PAD in mental 
illness might sometimes mean we are colluding with a person’s pathology in bringing about her 
death, it is also true that by forbidding PAD in mental illness we could sometimes refrain from 
giving much-needed succor to a person who is suffering severely and whose request for death is 
reasonable and made with full capacity.   
 
The severity of suffering 
 24 
 
A third kind of objection to the parity argument focuses on our premise that suffering due 
to mental illness can be as bad as suffering due to physical illness.  To be sure, we have no way of 
demonstrating definitively that the two can be on a par, though we would point out that some 
persons with mental illness—those who harm themselves intentionally—appear to prefer physical 
pain to emotional pain (Madge, et al. 2008).  We would also invite interlocutors to imagine 
someone with a relatively painless, terminal physical illness who chooses PAD to end or prevent 
the emotional or existential suffering that her illness brings.  If that is justifiable (and it seems to 
be permitted by PAD statues in the U.S.), PAD in mental illness should sometimes be justifiable, 
too.  After all, mental illnesses are (at least sometimes) also physical illness, even if they are not 
consistently understood to be such.  And why should it matter whether the cause of the emotional 
suffering is physical or mental, inside the body or outside it, if either way it is intense and 
irremediable? 
Finally, one could challenge the argument by objecting to the claims that the suffering due 
to mental illness can be as intractable or as prolonged as that due to physical illness.  We, at least, 
regard such objections as unpersuasive: there is ample evidence that those afflicted with mental 
illness can suffer from it for years, even decades, and in some cases, this is in spite of aggressive 
treatment with nearly all available modalities (Greden 2001, Nemeroff 2007).  We acknowledge 
the worry that some instances of PAD or euthanasia for mental illnesses in Europe have occurred 
in persons who had not exhausted all reasonable treatments (Kim, et al. 2016).  But this does not 
preclude the existence of persons who really have tried every option.  [Omitted for review] would 
point out, regretfully, that he meets such patients all too frequently. 
 




Psychiatry and related mental health disciplines are deeply devoted to preventing suicide.  In doing 
so, psychiatry sometimes employs coercive measures, such as forcibly admitting patients to locked 
hospital wards (Monahan, et al. 1995).  Although the legal constraints vary from one state to 
another, in many jurisdictions in the U.S., patients who are suffering from a mental illness and 
who are severely suicidal can be held involuntarily for a period, sometimes several days, 
sometimes a week or more, while awaiting evaluation in court, and may then receive an 
involuntary commitment order to treatment lasting months (Treatment Advocacy Center 2016). 
Most states also permit the involuntary administration of medications to persons who are at risk of 
harming themselves or others because of a mental illness, if certain criteria are satisfied (Treatment 
Advocacy Center 2016).  
In fact, the majority of states (46, plus the District of Columbia) allow persons to be 
committed solely because they have a mental illness and are at risk of harming themselves 
(Treatment Advocacy Center 2016).  To be sure, some state laws (in Alabama, Illinois, Iowa, 
Kansas, and Utah) allow civil commitment only if a person is judged to be incompetent (that is, to 
lack decision-making capacity) in addition to being at substantial risk of harming herself.  Still, 
we would speculate (based on [omitted for review]’s clinical experience) that serious suicidal 
ideation is generally taken as de facto evidence of incapacity in those states that require incapacity 
(or incompetence) for civil commitment, and that the bodies responsible for ordering commitment 
rarely conduct independent assessments of capacity in those cases.  For the courts, often, being 
suicidal is enough. 
Such practices are at odds with permitting PAD in mental illness.  Most persons with 
mental illness who contemplate, attempt, or complete suicide are motivated by a desire to end their 
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own emotional suffering (Schnyder, et al. 1999, Bryan, et al. 2013), while others are motivated by 
a desire to avoid imposing burdens on others or to make others better off (Brown, et al. 2002, 
Joiner, et al. 2002, May, et al. 2013).  Laws permitting the involuntary psychiatric hospitalization 
of suicidal persons, however, suggest that suicide is unreasonable.  And to the extent that suicide 
is deemed unreasonable, its motivating judgments—the judgment that one’s suffering is so great 
it is better to die—must also be deemed unreasonable.   
If the above is correct, however, it would imply that PAD in mental illness would often be 
unreasonable, since it would presumably be motivated by the ill person’s own judgment that their 
suffering is an adequate reason for self-killing, much as in ordinary suicide.  Moreover, to the 
extent that psychiatry should be empowered to prevent suicide in persons suffering with mental 
illness, this argument holds, society should not permit PAD for persons suffering solely from a 
mental illness. 
There are, of course, some objections to consider. It would be easy to dismiss the legal 
status quo surrounding civil commitment as merely a legal, rather than a moral, matter.  But we 
think that involuntary commitment laws reflect important moral truths.  Suicide is typically tragic; 
it often represents an unnecessary loss; it is right for us to fear that it might touch our family or 
friends and to fight against it when we can.  Imagine discovering that a child, a partner, or a sibling 
was depressed and wished to die, that he planned to kill himself, that he was on the cusp of 
overdosing or shooting himself.  In that case, one would prevent the act if one could, and enlist 
any available medical help to do so.   
There have, of course, been challenges to the moral justifiability of civil commitment 
processes, most along the lines that it is inefficacious, overly paternalistic, aversive, and coercive 
(Szasz 1971, Morse 1982, Szasz 1986, Appel 2007, Prinsen, et al. 2009, Moncrieff 2014).  
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Although many of these concerns have at least some merit, we regard the notion that involuntary 
civil commitment for suicidal persons is sometimes permissible to be mainstream and plausible. 
In this respect, it is much like the notion that PAD in terminal illness is permissible, which is 
clearly somewhat controversial, too. 
One could instead object that psychiatry’s moral imperative to prevent suicide is not 
merely, or even partially, dependent on an assessment of the values motivating the action, but is 
instead driven by the fear that the suicidal person is acting impulsively, out of confusion or 
agitation, or because they are reasoning poorly.  Again, as the AAS has pointed out, suicides 
typically differ from physician-assisted deaths in these ways, and others ([omitted for review]).  In 
that case, psychiatry’s reasons for preventing suicide would not apply to many decisions to seek 
PAD.  Assessments of capacity would suffice to prevent problematically, impulsively, 
unreasonably suicidal persons from using PAD to die.  
The problem with this objection, though, is that psychiatry as it is currently practiced does 
not generally require an assessment of whether the suicidal person is acting impulsively or 
unreasonably to justify its interventions.  Being suicidal in the context of a mental illness per se is 
enough.  Again, most involuntary commitment laws in the U.S. ask only whether the person with 
mental illness is at risk of harming herself before allowing her civil commitment.  We would also 
point out that, in practice, the more persistent a patient’s suicidal motives are, and the more 
considered or premeditated her plan for suicide, the more alarming her clinical condition tends to 
be, and the more likely she is to receive an involuntary commitment  in order to prevent her suicide, 
if commitment has been sought.  Thus it is also the desire to kill oneself because of one’s suffering, 
and not merely the matter of whether one’s actions are impulsive or poorly reasoned, that is held 





We think, therefore, that U.S. medicine generally and psychiatry in particular face a 
dilemma—indeed, an impending moral crisis—in the face of legal PAD.  On the one hand, part of 
the core justification for laws permitting PAD in physical illnesses is the alleviation of severe 
suffering, even if that is not explicitly articulated in U.S. statutes.  Since suffering due to mental 
illness can, at least sometimes, be as severe as suffering due to physical illnesses, it would also 
seem to provide an adequate justification for PAD in some cases, at least when capacity 
requirements are satisfied.  On the other hand, the suffering that frequently motivates suicide 
among persons with mental illness is generally not accepted as an adequate reason for suicide, 
implying that it should not be enough to justify PAD in such cases, either. We recognize, of course, 
that parallel dilemmas might be raised by other issues related to those described here: whether 
PAD sometimes is thought to reduce the social and economic burdens imposed by persons with 
severe illnesses, whether permitting PAD increases stigma toward those with terminal illness or 
mental illnesses, and more.   
So how to resolve the dilemma we have posed? Two simple but extreme solutions would 
be either to conclude that psychiatry (and society more generally) is wrong to prevent people from 
attempting suicide, even in the least controversial cases, or instead that PAD is wrong, even in the 
least controversial cases.  But given the compelling reasons supporting both PAD and the 
involuntary commitment of suicidal persons, neither of these simple solutions is adequate. A more 
nuanced approach is indicated, and we see three initial possibilities.  
The first possibility is to keep PAD laws and involuntary civil commitment practices as 
they are, despite their deep inconsistencies. This would be to continue to require that the illnesses 
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for which PAD can be granted must be terminal.  Such a policy has the advantage of simplicity. 
Its conservatism might also seem a virtue: because suicide occurs far more often than PAD in 
states where PAD is legal (for instance: in Oregon 133 people died under the Death With Dignity 
Act in 2016, while at least 772 died by suicide) (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2018, 
Death with Dignity 2018), we might worry that if we were to extend PAD to include non-terminal 
illnesses, it would encompass too many people with mental illnesses whose plans to kill themselves 
are unreasonable.  
The problem with this solution, of course, is just that it remains inconsistent, that it ignores 
the fact that suffering due to mental illness, like suffering due to physical illness, can be really bad, 
and genuinely without hope of improvement. By holding the line we refuse to hear some legitimate 
pleas for help.  The status quo might seem callous. 
The second approach could be to allow PAD for some persons with mental illnesses, while 
changing practices of involuntary civil commitment in a corresponding way, by reemphasizing the 
roles that decision-making capacity plays in both.  We might take the view that anyone should 
have access to PAD, if they decide to pursue it and have the capacity to make that decision, 
irrespective of whether their underlying medical diagnosis is physical or mental, terminal or non-
terminal. This is more or less the European way of doing things: there, people who are suffering 
severely and who have capacity can choose PAD or euthanasia irrespective of whether their 
underlying illness is terminal or not, so long as it involves intolerable suffering that cannot be 
relieved by any means acceptable to the patient. To achieve consistency with this, psychiatry 
would have to limit itself to preventing suicide through involuntary civil commitment only when 
a suicidal person lacks decision-making capacity.  There are obvious merits to this compromise.  
It would help satisfy those who advocate for stronger self-determination at the end of life including 
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with respect to suicide, and would still leave a substantial scope for civil commitment, since many 
persons who are already subject to commitment for suicidal ideation would continue to be so, as 
their decisions to kill themselves are clearly made without capacity because of the effects of 
psychosis, intoxication, or severe but short-lived emotional duress (den Hartogh 2016).   
But there is a problem here, too.  As we noted earlier, it is generally thought that the effects 
of a mental illness on a person’s values sometimes mean that he lacks capacity even if his cognitive 
abilities are intact (Elliott 1997, Charland 2002, Rudnick 2002).  Although, as we argued above, a 
person with mental illness may not always be incapacitated because her illness alters her values, 
we are still confronted by Gupta’s and Desmarais’s worry: how can we tell when she is, and when 
she is not?  To reemphasize assessments of capacity in civil commitment laws would require us to 
answer this question.  And, we suspect, doing so will ultimately depend on whether we think the 
mentally ill person’s suffering presents a good enough reason for self-killing—so that the 
authenticity of someone’s values and the voluntariness of her decision depend in large part on our 
assessment of whether her values are reasonable (Kious 2016). 
The third approach—into which the second might ultimately collapse—is to devise a 
metric for suffering in both mental and physical illness and to allow PAD (and, likewise, suicide) 
for persons whose suffering exceeds some threshold designated as “unbearable,” while allowing 
the involuntary commitment and treatment of persons who plan to kill themselves because of 
suffering but whose expected suffering falls below that threshold.  The practical challenges of 
this—such as whom we should appoint to make such decisions, the possible role of psychiatrists 
and other mental health providers in serving as gatekeepers for PAD, and how we should require 
patients to submit to their judgment—are surely serious.  But the approach has several more 
theoretical difficulties, too.  First, there is the issue of the metric itself: how are we to gauge the 
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severity of someone’s suffering when he tells us he wishes to die in order to be spared it?  We can, 
of course, just ask him, but this will generally fail to differentiate suffering that justifies death from 
suffering that does not, since the answer will be the same in both cases. Second, as Cassell and 
others have noted, the badness of suffering—indeed, to a degree, even whether someone suffers in 
a particular set of circumstances—depends not only on the sensations and emotions that underpin 
that suffering, but on the individual’s implicit beliefs about the meaning of those experiences, on 
how long she assumes they are likely to last, on how much control she takes herself to have over 
it, on how much anxiety it produces, and so on.  How to evaluate each of these dimensions when 
we cannot wholly trust first-person reports is deeply unclear.  Most seriously, even assuming that 
we are able to measure and rank the severity of different persons’ suffering, determining what 
degree of suffering is enough to justify death requires contentious public and professional value 
judgments. There will be cases (indeed, there are cases) where individuals say that the suffering 
they face is reason enough to die, but psychiatrists are professionally obliged to disagree.  Who is 
right?  How much suffering can we reasonably demand that others tolerate for their own good? 
 Similar difficulties arise in assessing the likelihood that one’s suffering will resolve (either 
spontaneously or through treatment) and in determining how unlikely, given a particular degree of 
suffering, recovery ought to be before we say further attempts at treatment are futile.  We can, of 
course, trot out the available statistics about the chance that a person with a particular set of 
characteristics will respond to a particular degree to a particular intervention.  But sometimes 
relevant statistics are not available, which is especially true in cases of treatment-refractory mental 
illness, as they are rarer and often not systematically studied.  Moreover, making this determination 
requires a comparison of expected harms and benefits, which ultimately requires, again, that we 
weigh both the severity of a person’s suffering, both now and in the foreseeable future,  and the 
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value of her life without it.  Yet we must also recognize that this is to try to objectify degrees of 
suffering, and risks insensitivity to the individual’s own unique experiences of states he or she 
cannot tolerate.  
  Whether we take the second or the third approach, then, we think resolving this dilemma 
(rather than consenting to leave it unresolved, as with the first option) depends on a deep and 
difficult question: when is it worse that someone die, whether from suicide or with physician 
assistance, who could have been helped, and when is it worse that someone whose suffering could 
only be alleviated by death continues to suffer?  The answer to this question still eludes us; while 
we are waiting for it, the best we can do is to hope for enough improvement in the treatment of 
severe mental illness, including increases in access to existing types of treatment, that it arises less 
and less frequently. 
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